This paper is concerned with making causal inferences with ecological data. Aggregate outcome information is combined with individual demographic information from separate data sources to make causal inferences about individual behavior. In addressing such problems, even under the selection on observables assumption often made in the treatment effects literature, it is not possible to identify causal effects of interest. However, recent results from the partial identification literature provide the tightest upper and lower bounds on these causal effects. We apply these bounds to data from Chilean mayoral elections that straddle a 2012 change in Chilean electoral law from compulsory to voluntary voting. Aggregate voting outcomes are combined with individual demographic information from separate data sources to determine the causal effect of the change in the law on voter turnout. The bounds analysis reveals that voluntary voting decreased expected voter turnout, and that other causal effects are overstated if the bounds analysis is ignored.
However, Fan et al. (2014a) show that these causal effects, even under the selection on observables assumption, cannot be identified when aggregate outcome data is combined with individual demographic data from separate sources. The information lost through aggregation precludes identification. However, these authors also establish upper and lower bounds on AT E and AT T which are valid under data combination. Moreover, these bounds are sharp, meaning that they are the tightest bounds possible under the maintained assumptions.
We apply these results to our ecological data to estimate bounds on causal effects of the change from compulsory to voluntary voting on turnout in Chilean mayoral elections. In this application aggregate turnout data must be combined with individual-level census data in order to make causal inferences about the effect of this policy change on voter turnout. We present bounds on AT E and show that voluntary voting decreased expected voter turnout. We also show that AT T is overstated by a standard difference analysis. For example, for Chile as a whole, the standard difference analysis estimates almost a 27% decrease in turnout for the voting-age population under the new law. The robust bounds analysis, on the other hand, estimates anywhere from a 15% decrease to 1.2% increase in turnout. We show that this pattern holds for many other subsets of the population: ignoring the bounds analysis results in an overstatement of the negative effect of the change from compulsory to voluntary voting on turnout for the voting-age population under the new law.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the ecological inference model considered in this paper, and discuss how to bound the causal effects of interest, using the results in Fan et al. (2014a) . Section 3 describes the background of the change in Chilean voting law as well as the data we use for our analysis. Section 4 presents the results of our bounds analysis.
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and indicate directions for future work.
Section 2: The Ecological Inference Framework and Bounding Causal Effects
In this section, we introduce the ecological inference model considered in this paper. We define the causal effects of interest in this paper, namely, the average treatment effect AT E, and the average treatment effect on the treated AT T . Then, using the results in Fan et al. (2014a) , we define sharp population bounds on AT E and AT T and show how to estimate these bounds. Finally, we discuss asymptotic results that allow inference on AT E and AT T .
Let D denote an observed binary treatment assignment indicator. That is, D = 1 if an individual is assigned to the treatment group and D = 0 if an individual is assigned to the control group.
Let Y D denote an individual outcome of interest. We adopt the "potential outcomes" approach to determining treatment effects pioneered by Rubin (1974) . This approach views each individual as having a treatment outcome Y 1 and a control outcome Y 0 , but only one of Y 1 and Y 0 is actually
The standard "potential outcomes" approach requires that the analyst observe (Y, D, Z) for each individual in the sample. In the applications we consider, the link between observed outcomes and covariates is considerably weaker. Instead of observing outcomes and covariates for each individual receiving a given treatment, we observe outcomes on one set of individuals who undergo a given treatment, and we observe covariates on a different set of individuals who receive that treatment. In other words, we observe separate outcome and covariate data sets. The outcome data set contains (Y, D) while the covariate data set contains (D, Z). Both data sets contain the treatment variable D which links the two sources of information. The objective is to combine these data sources to make inferences about the effect of treatment on outcomes. This is an ecological inference problem. We also note that in some applications, we observe separate outcome and covariate data sets for each treatment. That is, we observe (Y 1 , D = 1) and (D = 1, Z), the treatment outcomes and covariates, in separate data sets. Likewise, we observe (Y 0 , D = 0) and (D = 0, Z), the control outcomes and covariates, in separate data sets.
Next, we present the selection on observables and overlap assumptions, which are commonly made in the treatment effects literature (even without data combination) and which we also make. Selection on observables is a conditional independence assumption and overlap is a support assumption. Let Z denote the support of the covariate vector Z. For each z ∈ Z let p(z) = IP {D = 1 | Z = z}, the so-called propensity score.
A1. Selection on Observables
Randomized trials imply that (Y 1 , Y 0 , Z) is independent of D, which says that treatment and control outcomes, as well as observed covariates, are independent of treatment assignment. In fact, randomized trials imply that no variables are confounded with the treatment: the distribution of all variables, observed and unobserved, that affect treatment and control outcomes is the same in the treatment and control groups. In this sense, the only difference between treatment and control outcomes is the treatment, and so the causal effect of the treatment can be inferred from a comparison of treatment and control outcomes. The selection on observables assumption A1 is a conditional randomized trial assumption: once we condition on observables Z, outcomes are independent of treatment assignment.
That is, given Z, there are no confounding variables: the distribution of all unobserved variables that affect outcomes is the same in the treatment and control groups. However, A1 allows observed variables to be confounded with the treatment in the sense that the distribution of observed variables is allowed to be different in the treatment and control groups. The overlap assumption A2 states that for each z ∈ Z, there is a positive probability that some individual is assigned to the treatment group and a positive probability that some individual is assigned to the control group. Assumption A2 guarantees that in large samples there will be both treatment and control outcomes for each z ∈ Z. Assumptions A1 and A2 make valid comparison of treatment and control outcomes possible for each z ∈ Z.
When there is no data combination problem, that is, if (Y, D, Z) is observed for each individual in the sample, then under A1 and A2, standard propensity score methods (see, for example, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) ) can be applied to point-identify and consistently estimate causal effects like AT E and AT T . On the other hand, when there is a data combination problem -that is, when (Y, D, Z) are only observed in separate datasets -Fan et. al. (2014a) show that even if A1 and A2 hold, these causal effects cannot be identified. However, they go on to derive sharp upper and lower bounds on quantities like AT E and AT T using inequalities from the copula literature.
Recall the propensity score p(Z) = IP {D = 1 | Z}. Let W = 1/p(Z) and V = 1/[1 − p(Z)]. Define p 1 = IP {D = 1}, the marginal probability of receiving treatment. Define p 0 = 1 − p 1 . Foreshadowing our application, we develop notation for the special but common case in which the treatment and control outcomes Y 1 and Y 0 , and therefore the observed outcomes Y , are binary.
Define p 00 = IP {Y = 0 | D = 0}, p 01 = IP {Y = 0 | D = 1}, and p 11 = IP {Y = 1, D = 1}. Let X denote an arbitrary random variable. For d = 0, 1, write F X|D (· | d) for the cumulative distribution function of X given D = d. Write Q X|D (· | d) for the quantile function of X given D = d. Define the average treatment effect AT E and the average treatment effect on the treated AT T as follows:
The following result is a special case of Theorem 3.2 in Fan et al. (2014a) .
. . n 1 denote iid observations of outcome and treatment variables from the outcome data set(s). Let (D j , Z j ), j = 1, . . . , n 2 denote iid observations of treatment and demographic variables from the covariate data set(s). We estimate the population intervals with corresponding sample intervals:
We use (Y i , D i ), i = 1, . . . , n 1 to construct the sample proportionsp 1 ,p 0 ,p 01 ,p 00 , andp 11 . For
, and so on.
We use (D j , Z j ), j = 1, . . . , n 2 to constructp(Z), a consistent estimator of the propensity score.
There are many ways to estimate the propensity score. One can use parametric estimation procedures like probit or logit, semiparametric estimation procedures, or nonparametric estimation procedures.
The estimated quantile functions above are functions of the estimated quantile function of the propensity score. For ease of notation, define P = p(Z). For d = 0, 1, we define the estimated quantile function of P given D = d to beQ P |D (u | d) = inf{a :F P |D (a | d) > u} whereF P |D (· | d) is the estimated empirical cumulative distribution function of P given D = d. That is, withP j =p(Z j ),
Using the fact that W is a monotone decreasing function of P , and V and V /W are monotone increasing functions of P , we get that
Finally, the integrals in the expressions above are numerical integrals over the indicated subsets of the unit interval. Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 in Fan et al. (2014b) can be used to prove that the vector of lower and upper bound estimators for both AT E and AT T are √ n-consistent and jointly asymptotically normally distributed estimators of their population counterparts. This result permits us to apply the methods in Stoye (2009) to compute asymptotic confidence intervals for AT E and AT T .
Section 3: Application to Chilean Voting System Reform From the time democracy was reintroduced in Chile in 1989 until the registration and voting system was reformed in 2012, electoral participation required self-initiated registration into the electoral rolls.
Notably, registration was voluntary while voting, conditional on being registered, was compulsory. This combination is rare in the world. Most countries have either automatic registration with voluntary voting (e.g., Germany, Britain), both voluntary registration and voluntary voting (the United States), or automatic registration and compulsory voting (Belgium).
In January of 2012 the Chilean government passed a law replacing a system of compulsory voting in municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections, with a system of voluntary voting. Prior to the 2012 reforms, the cost of registration in Chile was particularly high. Citizens had to register in person at the registration office in the district where they wanted to vote. There were few registration offices in electoral districts, and most were not located near easily accessible bureaucratic offices. There were also significant information and scheduling costs. 2 In addition, the mixture of voluntary registration and compulsory voting further increased the cost of registration for new entrants. According to the 2010 Chilean National Youth Survey, one out of ten nonregistered citizens did not register because of the perceived burden of having to vote in all subsequent elections. 3 Part of this burden was the threat of a substantial monetary penalty if one failed to vote.
The effects of the Chilean voluntary registration and compulsory voting policy on the age structure of voters are notorious. Older citizens, who registered in large numbers in 1988 in order to vote in the first democratic referendum, were generally committed voters, conforming to the mandatory feature of the rule. Younger cohorts, however, had been increasingly reluctant to register during the post-authoritarian period. As a result, older voters were over-represented while younger voters were under-represented: the turnout rate for those aged 35 and above was close to 90 percent in 2009, while in the same year the rate for adults aged 18 − 29 was only 23 percent. Carlin (2006) and Corvalan and Cox (2013) note that this participation rate for younger voters was by far the lowest among Latin American countries. Indeed, the desire to increase voter turnout among young voters was a principal motive to reform the registration and voting rules. In January 31, 2012, Electoral Law 20,568 made registration automatic and voting voluntary.
Since the passage of these reforms in 2012, all eligible voters are automatically registered to vote and may voluntarily vote in presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections. A natural question to ask is "What effect did the change in the law have on election turnout?" We address this causal question using the new methods. Since the first elections under the new system were the municipal elections in 2012, we focus our analysis on the most important of the municipal races, namely, the races for mayor.
2 These costs are consistent with findings in Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) . It should also be noted that a registered voter could cancel his or her registration. However, the cancellation process was just as burdensome as registration itself.
3 These survey results are consistent with results on cost-benefit analysis in the theory of rational voting, as in Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) .
Chile is divided into 15 regions, which are subdivided into communes or counties. Each commune is governed by a municipality headed by a mayor and a municipal council. Municipal elections in Chile have taken place every four years since 1992. In each election, both the mayor and the council members are elected. Since 2004, the mayor has been elected separately from the council members.
Mayoral candidates compete for one seat in each commune and are elected under plurality rule.
We have aggregate voting data for the first mayoral elections under voluntary voting in 2012 as well as aggregate voting data for the first direct mayoral election in 2004, when voting was still compulsory. variables, which means that the distribution of all observed and unobserved variables affecting turnout is the same in both election years. But this is implausible. For example, the distribution of household income is different in 2004 and 2012, and income is likely to affect turnout. That is, income is likely to be a confounding factor. Age may also be a confounding factor. As mentioned in Section 3, the change to voluntary voting was motivated in part by the desire to increase turnout among young voters. Moreover, even if a strong exogeneity condition holds, standard linear and binary regression methods are impracticable because of the data combination problem. Similar objections can be raised about simple difference-in-differences methods as well as standard linear and binary regression versions of the difference-in-differences techniques.
A new approach. Given the inadequacies of the naïve difference measure, we turn to our new approach. In the Chilean voting application, the treatment D = 1 corresponds to voluntary voting in Chilean mayoral elections in 2012 and the treatment D = 0 corresponds to compulsory voting in Since the current law makes registration automatic, AT T is arguably just as interesting a causal measure as AT E.
In this section, we present estimated bounds on AT E and AT T for the entire population of Chile as well as for interesting subsets of this population, such as the population of men, the population of women, the 15 regions of Chile, and different age groups.
As stated previously, in this application, the observed outcome if an eligible voter is not registered, since registration is a necessary condition for voting. 5 Note that an eligible voter in 2004 can also be an eligible voter in 2012. However, D can never be both zero and one since our methods formally treat each voter in 2004 as different from each voter in 2012.
election year is 2004. Note that we are identifying D = 1 with the treatment voluntary voting and D = 0 with the control compulsory voting. This identification is valid under assumption A1.
The treatment outcomes (Y 1 , D = 1) are obtained from a 2012 INE data set while the treatment covariates (D = 1, Z) are obtained from a 2011 CASEN data set. Similarly, the control outcomes (Y 0 , D = 0) are obtained from a 2004 INE data set while the control covariates (D = 0, Z) are obtained from a 2003 CASEN data set. We take the observed covariate zector Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z 6 ) = (loginc, age, educ, gender, unemp, married) . Table 1 describes In order to estimate the bounds on AT E and AT T given in Theorem 1, we must first estimate the propensity score p(Z j ) = IP {D j = 1 | Z j } using the CASEN data (D j , Z j ), j = 1, . . . , n 2 from each population subset of interest. For the country as a whole and for each of the 15 regions of Chile we estimate the propensity score by estimating the coefficients of the probit regression
We also estimate separate propensity score models for men and women and separate models for age We present results of estimating the probit regression above for the entire country. Recall that we use the combined CASEN data sets from 2011 and 2003 to estimate the propensity score. We interpret the propensity score as the conditional probability that an observation comes form 2012 rather than 2004. Table 2 presents coefficient estimates and standard deviations for the probit regression for the entire country. We see that all the variables make a statistically significant marginal contribution to the model. The first five make positive contributions, whereas the married variable makes a negative contribution. We can interpret the significant positive coefficient on loginc as implying that ceteris paribus, eligible voters in 2012 had higher income than in 2004 (which reflects the overall rise in the economic fortunes of Chile as a whole during that period). Similar interpretations can be made for the other variables in the model.
It is useful at this point to make the following observation. Suppose that the set of observed covariates Z has no predictive power in the probit regression above. Note that this holds if D is independent of Z. Now, if D is independent of Z and A1 holds, then (Y 1 , Y 0 , Z) is independent of D, which follows from a randomized trial assumption. Under the randomized trial assumption, AT E and AT T are equal and the simple difference estimator
(1−D i ) is a consistent estimator of AT E and AT T . No bounds analysis is needed in this case. Figure 1 . Displayed in this figure are 95% confidence intervals for AT E and AT T for the country as a whole, as well as for men and women separately. For better visual effect, these confidence intervals are represented as boxes, where the length of a box is the length of the corresponding confidence interval. Focus on the box for AT E for the country. The ordinate of any point on the top of this box is the upper bound estimate for AT E given in (1) plus a standard error correction computed using the procedure of Stoye (2009) . The ordinate of any point on the bottom of this box is the lower bound estimate for AT E given in (1) minus a standard error correction computed using Stoye's procedure. 6 The box is split in the middle by a line. The starred point represents the simple difference estimate defined in the last paragraph. 7 Corresponding statements apply to the other AT E boxes and to the AT T boxes.
Now turn to
Consider the AT E boxes in Figure 1 . We see that for the country as a whole as well as for men and women separately, the simple difference estimates suggest that voluntary voting decreased voter turnout. This suggestion is confirmed by the robust bounds analysis: each 95% confidence interval upper bound is below the zero level.
Next consider the AT T boxes in Figure 1 and recall that AT T may be the more relevant causal measure since registration and therefore eligibility is automatic under current Chilean law. We see that the robust bounds do not contain the simple difference estimates. Under A1, this is strong evidence against the randomized trial assumption and strong evidence for the need for this type of bounds analysis. If the bounds analysis were ignored, the negative effect of voluntary voting on turnout for eligible voters in 2012 would be overstated. In fact, notice that all three AT T boxes contain the point zero, although just barely. This suggests that under assumptions A1 and A2, we cannot reject the hypothesis that voluntary voting had no effect on turnout for eligible voters in 2012 at the 5% level.
On the other hand, this hypothesis might be rejected at a less stringent significance level. Figure 2 , which displays bounds results for AT E and AT T for the 15 regions comprising Chile. As a reference point, the last box in Figure 2 represents the results in Figure 1 for the country as a whole. The results for the individual regions are qualitatively the same as those for the country as a whole. All the AT E boxes are below the zero level and, with the exception of Region 15, contain the corresponding simple differences estimates. Note that the AT T boxes for Regions 5, 11, 12, and 13 are all below the zero level, implying that voluntary voting has, at the 5% level, a statistically significant negative effect on turnout in these regions. In all regions except possibly Regions 1 and 13, 6 As mentioned in Section 2, the procedure of Stoye (2009) is valid under joint asymptotic normality of the lower and upper bound estimators given in (1) and (2). The joint asymptotic normality results are given in Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.2, respectively, in Fan et al. (2014b) . The asymptotic standard errors in these theorems are estimated with the bootstrap to produce our standard error corrections. We note that the standard error corrections in this application are typically negligible compared to the length of the bounds. 7 The turnout difference estimates can be taken as exact population differences. The reason is that they are based on very large sample sizes, making the length of the corresponding confidence intervals zero for all practical purposes.
Now consider
ignoring the bounds analysis and taking the simple difference estimates at face value overstates the negative effect of voluntary voting on turnout for those eligible to vote in 2012.
Finally, consider Figure 3 , which displays results for AT E and AT T conditional on age. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in the previous figures. However, focus on the two youngest age categories, and recall that one of the motivations for changing from compulsory to voluntary voting was to try to increase turnout among young voters. We see that the AT E and the AT T boxes both straddle the zero level for the 18 -24 and 25 -29 age categories, and the AT T box for the 18 -24 age category is nearly above the zero level. While not conclusive at the 5% significance level, the results do not rule out the possibility that voluntary voting had a positive effect on turnout among younger voters, in line with the intended goals of the policy change.
Section 5: Conclusion
This paper uses new partial identification results from the treatment effects literature on data combination to make inferences about causal effects in ecological inference problems. Of course, the need for causal inference and counterfactual evaluation (in contrast to simple before-after comparison of outcomes from policy changes) is well understood in political science, and methods are readily available. But these methods break down when the researcher must combine aggregate and individuallevel data sources as part of the causal inference exercise. The novel contribution of this paper is to propose methodology which works in this case. More broadly, the need to combine different data sources in causal effect modelling appears commonplace in political science. Besides the application considered in this paper, other potential applications include measuring the effect of introducing electronic voting on vote outcomes, the effects of war on health outcomes, or the effects of political turmoil on economic activity. In all these cases, one needs to combine aggregate (precinct-, regional-, or country-level) outcome data with demographic confounders measured at the individual level.
We apply our methodology to bound causal effects of a change from compulsory to voluntary voting on turnout in recent Chilean mayoral elections. The bounds analysis reveals that the change had a negative effect on expected turnout and that ignoring this analysis and applying a simple difference estimator leads to overstating the negative effect of the change on those who are eligible to vote under the current voluntary voting laws. In future work, we plan to study the effect of the change in the law on turnout as well as other voting outcomes in recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Chile. 
